Before the Russian army entered Ukraine, the outside world believed that Moscow would first use a large-scale cyber attack to cut off Ukraine’s communications before driving in the chariots. The road is still quite clear, and experts believe that it may be related to the fact that the Russian army itself also relies on the local network.
Due to the mixed warfare offensive of the Russian army in Crimea in 2014, it successfully confuses and delays the reaction time of the West and achieves the record of winning the Donbas and Crimea. The world has a great sense of Russia’s network and information attack capabilities. shock.
Therefore, before February 24, media and experts from various countries predicted that if the Russian army attacked, it should first use a large-scale network attack to interfere with communication nodes such as Ukraine’s power grid, radio and television, and mobile networks, causing communication in the country. The black hole, combined with false news such as the fall of the capital and the flight of the president, first disintegrated the morale of the Ukrainian military and civilian resistance, and replicated the successful model of Crimea.
In an interview with Defense One, a U.S. Pentagon official pointed out that although the Russian military’s cyber offensive was indeed observed during the war, the scope of the impact was too small, and no major damage was caused except for the interruption of communication in a few areas and the bombing of the TV tower. .
The reason for not completely cutting off the communication network in Ukraine may be that after the attack, the Russian army discovered that the local communication infrastructure is still of great use to itself, especially in the coordination of the Russian army attack in the enemy’s territory. It may not be possible to rely on it alone. The communication facilities provided by the Russian army were carried out.
Retired Major General John Ferrari of the U.S. Army pointed out that the scale of the Russian military offensive was much larger than that during the Crimea crisis, so the demand for communication traffic was quite huge. The new “Warfighting Information Network-Tactical, WIN-T” system in , also encountered many difficulties in progress.
Major General Ferrari said that after entering Ukraine, the Russian army may need to rely on smartphones and local mobile networks for coordination and navigation due to the fact that the progress of the war is not as expected, the need for communication between multiple fronts is too great, and the communication facilities are insufficient. Disrupting the local network can actually hinder your own actions. In addition, Russia also needs to monitor the movements of the Ukrainian military and civilian resistance forces through local networks.
For the Russian military, cutting off the communication network can dampen the Ukrainian government’s efforts to rally morale and win international public opinion, but it may put front-line troops at greater risk and increase the chance of getting lost, mistakenly attacked or ambushed, so Moscow may need more. measure over time.